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DISADVANTAGES OF A FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
Ralph M. Carson* 
''CONVENTIONS are serious things and ought not to be repeated." 
These words of Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of North Caro-
lina spoken in the closing debate of the Philadelphia Convention, 
September 15, 1787, are pertinent today to the suggestion sometimes 
bruited that in the exigency created by the latest revolutionary de-
cisions of the Supreme Court1 article V of the Constitution should 
be invoked to the end that Congress acting for the first time there-
under" ... call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which ... 
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several 
States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof . . . ." The im-
minence of action under this clause arises from the fact that 
thirty-two state legislatures have now applied for a new federal 
constitutional convention.2 In 1963 the legislatures of eighteen 
states submitted to Congress thirty-eight applications calling for 
such a convention; this is almost four times as many applications 
as were submitted to Congress in the first century of the Constitu-
tion. Twelve of these dealt with apportionment of state legislatures. 
Article V says that on application of two-thirds of the states 
Congress "shall" call the convention for proposing amendments. 
The imperative color of this word cannot be disregarded. It leaves 
no discretion in Congress as to the convening of an article V as-
sembly, although it may be consistent with some control by Congress 
over the modalities.3 A deliberate refusal on the part of Congress 
to call a convention, once the requisite number of state applications 
were in hand, may be expected, by enlarged analogy to what has 
been done in the recent civil rights cases and what is being pro-
posed in the electoral apportionment cases, to bring into play the 
powers of the Supreme Court to direct the setting up of the national 
convention. Such a crisis is one to be avoided. 
• Member of the New York Bar. A.B. 1917, University of Michigan; B.A., 1922, 
Oxford University; J.D., 1923, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
I. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
2. Statement of Senator Ervin in introducing S. 2307. 113 CONG. REc. S. 11757 
(daily ed. Aug. 17, 1967). 
3. S. 2307, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., is an attempt to deal with the procedure of a 
federal constitutional convention in various respects. Some of its provisions have been 
pointedly criticized by Mr. Theodore C. Sorensen in testimony before the Senate 
Judiciary Subcomm. on Separation of Powers, Oct. 30, 1967. 
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The novelty and drama of this conjuncture have suggested to 
some that a national constitutional convention might be a good thing. 
It might, some have intimated, serve as a useful school in the demo-
cratic process, educate the voters on a continental scale, and give 
the people new opportunity to revise their organic law. Nothing in 
my view could be more wrong. Nothing could show more mis-
apprehension of the nature of political organisms or the foundation 
of the vast structure which constitutes the American system today. 
A general and unlimited federal constitutional convention would 
at least be a futility and might be a disaster. 
I. EDMUND RANDOLPH'S MOTION FOR A 
SECOND CONVENTION IN 1787 
Pinckney's words were spoken in opposition to the motion of 
Edmund Randolph at the close of the deliberations in Philadelphia. 
The document prepared by the delegates not only was a mass of 
compromises but contained provisions or omissions unsatisfactory 
to many. Hence the motion was that the Constitution as drafted 
be submitted to conventions of the several states, and that after 
action by them it be re-submitted to a second convention for amend-
ment or revision. In opposition to this proposal Pinckney urged the 
confusion and contrariety of views that would arise from this pro-
cedure. Elbridge Gerry, Randolph, and George Mason supported 
the motion, it was defeated, and they refused to sign the Constitu-
tion. Jefferson, not a delegate, considered the lack of a Bill of Rights 
to be a capital defect of the draft, but told Madison that he would 
not oppose adoption because he did not want to run the risk of a 
second convention. Benjamin Franklin urged the delegates to sus-
pend their honest doubts in the hope that difficulties would work 
themselves out in practice. 
The considerations which in 1787 militated against a second 
constitutional convention are vastly stronger today. 
II. CHARACTER OF GENERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
The body which would be called into being by the action of 
Congress under article V would have revolutionary potentialities. 
As recently pointed out by the Supreme Court, once the procedure 
is set in motion, "there is no restraint on the kind of amendment 
that may be offered."4 While Congress in initiating the procedure 
4. Whitehill v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 57 (1967). 
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under article V will presumably fix a time and place and specify the 
composition of the convention, and while it may seek to limit the 
kind of amendment the convention shall propose, it would seem obvi-
ous that limitations of subject matter can be of no avail. Once con-
vened, the body of delegates to propose amendments in accordance 
with article V could, if they wished, raise the most fundamental ques-
tions by proposing a complete reorganization of the government. 
They could take the revolutionary step which the States-General of 
France took in 1789 in reconstituting themselves as the National 
Assembly. As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pointed out: 
A convention to amend the Constitution, without there is [sic] an 
express limitation as to the extent of their power, passed upon by 
the people in determining the question of amendment, has in-
herently, by the very nature of the case under the great principle 
peculiarly American, and quasi revolutionary in its character here-
tofore mentioned, absolute power, so far as may be necessary to 
carry out the purpose for which they were called into existence, by 
the popular will. Unless prohibited or restricted in the manner 
specified by the people, the convention has a right, untrammelled by 
mere legislative limitations,. to propose to the people for their con-
sideration and adoption any plan they may see fit.5 
·what we should be confronted with in a general constitutional 
convention would be, presumably, nothing like the twenty-five 
specific amendments which have from time to time in 170 years been 
adopted by separate consideration. The effort of a general conven-
tion would presumably be the herculean one of a revised and im-
proved constitutional structure for the entire country. The changes 
would be embodied in the subtle, ambivalent, and refractory ma-
terial which is the only instrument of the legal draftsman; that is, 
in words. Under present circumstances the task is hopeless. 
Every lawyer knows the treacherous, chameleon-like nature of the 
verbiage out of which a new constitution would have to be con-
structed. It has long been pointed out that "[t]he same words may 
have different meanings in different parts of the same act and of 
course words may be used in a statute in a different sense from that 
in which they are used in the constitution."6 Or, as Justice Holmes 
remarked in Towne v. Eisner: "A word is not a crystal, transparent 
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought ... . " 1 
5. Woods's Appeal, 75 Pa. 59, 67 (1874). 
6. Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60, 65 (1916). See also Towne v. Eisner, 245 
U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
7. Id. 
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What are the living thoughts which a new organic instrument 
would be expected to take into account? Their number is great, their 
complexity enormous. Federal-state relationships, the rights of 
minorities, the problem of poverty, the new demands of urban 
society, the allocation of the war power as between Congress and 
the Executive, apportionment of votes in relation to representation 
in state and federal governments, the church-state relationship-
these are only a few of the tensions and difficulties that now call for 
resolution and in respect of which the phraseology of a new con-
stitution would have to be chosen and measured. With jealousy and 
cunning the strong forces active on various sides of these and other 
great issues will in a constitutional convention strive to bend the 
draftsmanship to their purpose. 
Even if the correct solution of any of these problems could be 
sketched out in the tumult and pressures of a national convention, 
exactitude in formulating it cannot be expected. Delusive exactness, 
as has been well said, is a source of fallacy throughout the law;8 and 
in any new draft of a constitution resort will have to be had, as 
before, to generalities. The new words and phrases chosen for the 
new organic instrument could not come to rest in any final meaning 
until generations of judicial interpretation had explored and refined 
their application to particular states of fact. What has happened 
in the last century and a half in the fluctuating interpretation of the 
old phrases-the general welfare clause, due process, equal protection 
of the laws, the commerce clause-would have to be repeated in the 
next century and a half in respect of the new product of a federal 
constitutional convention. The ultimate results could not possibly 
be foreseen by the draftsmen of 1968. 
Rather one must anticipate that at the end of a long exegesis 
in the courts historians would feel the need to revise the result from 
a re-study of the verbal habits of the twentieth century, just as Pro-
fessor Crosskey has attempted, in analyzing the existing Constitu-
tion, " ... to provide the reader ... with a specialized dictionary of 
the eighteenth-century word-usages, and political and legal ideas, 
which are needed for a true understanding of the Constitu-
tion .... "9 Of the great generalities in which constitutions must be 
expressed, the proposition is especially true which the late Charles 
Curtis formulated for legal draftsmanship generally: 
8. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 342 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
9. '\,\T. CROSSKEY, 1 POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNil'ED 
STATES 5 (1953). 
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Words in legal documents . . . are simply delegations to others 
of authority to apply them to particular things or occasions .... 
They mean, therefore, not what their author intended them to 
mean, or even what meaning he intended, or expected, reasonably 
or not, others to give them. They mean, in the first instance, what 
the person to whom they are addressed makes them mean.10 
So eight Supreme Court Justices now hold that the fourth amend-
ment, adopted in 1791 to protect the right of the people "to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures," is violated by electronic surveillance 
of conversations in a public telephone booth.11 
III. GRAVE HANDICAPS OF PRESENT-DAY 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 
The Philadelphia Convention of 1787 possessed unique ad-
vantages. It came together in the atmosphere of crisis created by 
Shays' Rebellion and other events which brought home to the 
delegates the peril of the Union. It was favored by the attendance 
of outstanding men possessed of a common intellectual background 
through the literature of the eighteenth century Enlightenment. 
"Really," Jefferson 1\Tl"ote to John Adams, "it is an assembly of 
demigods." Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, and Madison are 
best known to us; but the group included seven former state gov-
ernors, twenty-eight former members of Congress, and eight signers 
of the Declaration of Independence. Filled with the gravity of their 
task, the delegates took measures to insure that their deliberations 
should be conducted with the secrecy essential to collective reflec-
tion and foresight. Only the outcome in the form of the :finished 
document was submitted to the public scrutiny. 
By contrast with the situation in 1787, delegates to a national 
constitutional convention of the present day would be subjected to 
impossible conflicts and pressures destructive of any possibility of 
calm deliberation. The three millions of the Atlantic fringe of settle-
ments living principally by agriculture have now spread across a 
continent wholly unknown to the draftsmen of 1787 and have 
multiplied to a mass of 200 millions, diverse in racial origin. The 
simple agricultural habits of colonial times, upon whose virtues 
10. C. Curtis, A Better Theory of Legal Interpretation in JURISPRUDENCE IN ACTION 
132, 156 (1953). 
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (1967) (Black, J., protesting against 
making the Court "a continuously functioning constitutional convention"). 
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Jefferson relied for honest rule by the majority, 12 have given place 
to a prodigious complex of industry, commerce, and finance, within 
a statutory framework undreamed of in the eighteenth century. Even 
more important, the functions of government in relation to the 
economic activity of the country have completely altered. Whereas in 
the eighteenth century contacts between the government and busi-
ness or agriculture were trifling, so that in the view of Jefferson and 
his school the only good government was a weak one, today political 
forces flowing from Washington or the state capitals interpenetrate, 
where they do not actually condition, the economic behavior of 
every citizen. The welfare state has come into being. Government 
is in business, and the business of government is very largely to 
divert the product of labor and industry to the maintenance or 
amelioration of various sections of the population, in the ratio more 
or less of their voting power. Hence at the present day the stakes of 
constitution-making are inconceivably great and differ toto coelo 
from what the delegates of 1787 had to deal ·with. · 
In these completely transformed perspectives, we must realize 
the handicaps to which a modern constitutional convention would 
be subjected. In the first place, its membership would be chiefly 
composed of political partisans, aligned in accordance with the 
economic forces, the racial or religious affiliations, and the ideologies 
which in more or less degree the great historic parties serve. These 
are the "factions" whose advent Washington dreaded. They are 
natural and inevitable in a democratic society, and their impact 
upon the processes of a national convention, however grave and 
momentous the issues, cannot be escaped. 
In the New York State Convention of 1967, for example, the 
effort was originally made to select delegates for their personal 
eminence and character, regardless of party affiliation. This failed; 
delegates were chosen by the electoral process, and the convention 
was organized on party lines with the Democratic speaker of the 
State Assembly as chairman. The Democratic majority yielded to 
the effort of the Catholic Diocese of New York to eliminate from the 
existing constitution the stringent prohibition against state aid to 
denominational schools, in the hope of obtaining tax money for 
Catholic education. The new constitution with this among other 
revisions was on the insistence of the convention chairman submitted 
to the voters as an entirety, rather than in sections which would 
12. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Dec. 20, 1787; see S. PADOVER, 
THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 123 (1943). 
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have isolated the parochial school amendment for separate vote. 
In consequence, the entire new draft was rejected by the electorate. 
A federal constitutional convention will necessarily abound in 
divisive issues of this kind. 
Moreover, the proceedings of convention delegates will be con-
ducted in the intense glare of publicity. Every word will be tran-
scribed. Imputations of motive, analyses, and predictions will fill the 
newspaper columns and flood the airways. Television will obtrude 
itself on the proceedings, in the name of the so-called "right of the 
people to know." A multitude of issues clamoring for attention will 
leave no time for reflection or long-range thought. With respect to 
the New York State Convention of 1967, for example, the Associa-
tion of the Bar of the City of New York found affairs were so 
conducted as to preclude meaningful consideration by the conven-
tion of informed comment on such matters as the judiciary article. 
The schedules followed by the convention allowed only forty-eight 
hours for public scrutiny of that important item. In the case of a 
national convention, the sacred ritual of the quadrennial nominat-
ing procedure will assert itself; and the deliberations of the 
constitution-makers will probably have to be carried on in the at-
mosphere of chaos and carnival which has been developed for the 
nomination of presidents. 
Finally, the terminology of the resultant document will have two 
characteristics that can be surely predicted. For one thing, it will be 
marked by the grandiloquence which characterizes (as shown by the 
Congressional Record) our political pronouncements. In addition, 
and with a view to the long-range effect upon the powerful interests, 
economic and other, to be affected by a new constitution, the draft 
produced will be loaded with the best semantic devices that the 
research psychologists of Madison Avenue can create.13 
In short, a national constitutional convention in our day must 
of necessity be the very opposite in character and conduct of the 
conclave which among the groves and classic facades of Philadelphia 
worked out the structure of the new commonwealth which was to 
represent the N ovus Ordo Saeclorum. 
l!l. Thus the Temporary National Economic Committee, whose hearings in 1939-
1940 were conducted with a view to framing legislation in the banking and financial 
field, devised for use in examining witnesses a phraseology, divided between "good 
words" and "bad words," which would color the testimony in the manner desired by 
examining counsel. This phraseology was created in advance of the hearings by an 
expert in public psychology. See Krock, The Prompters and Stage Managers of TNEC 
Hearings, N.Y. Times, June 7, 1939, at 22, col. 5. 
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IV. IRRELEVANCE OF CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
TO PRESENT GOVERNMENTAL PROBLEMS 
[Vol. 66:921 
In reality the concept of a new-minted organic law to reorganize 
and redirect the fabric of the national government is a fallacious 
one. The idea no doubt derives from the Philadelphia Convention 
and the somewhat false view of that classic episode conveyed by 
Gladstone's description of the American Constitution as "the most 
wonderful work ever struck off at a given time by the brain and 
purpose of man." Justified in some degree, this is also misleading. 
The Constitution of 1787 was by no means a new creation. It had 
been preceded by many political instruments on this side of the 
Atlantic. It codified American governmental experience as well as 
the principles which the draftsmen derived from the Magna Carta, 
the British constitution as represented by Blackstone, Montesquieu, 
and the Greek confederacies described in Plutarch or Aristotle. 
Behind the Constitution lay the Articles of Confederation (1777), 
and behind that the defense arrangements of the United Colonies 
of New England (1643), the Albany Conference of Four Colonies to 
Concert Measures against the Indians (1684), William Penn's aborted 
plan of union (1697), and the plan of union proposed by Ben-
jamin Franklin in 1754 to commissioners of seven colonies for deal-
ing with the French danger. Experience had also been gathered 
from the Stamp Act Congress which met in New York in 1765, as 
well as the First and Second Continental Congresses.14 
Not only are the words of the Constitution a codification of 
experience, but on them as a result of long usage and judicial 
interpretation has been evolved a living governmental structure. 
This encloses political processes of great subtlety and delicacy, 
independent of, even though originating from, the instrument of 
1787. As Justice Holmes said in 1vlissouri v. Holland, 
[W]hen we are dealing with words that also are a constituent act, 
like the Constitution of the United States, we must realize that they 
have called into life a being the development of which could not 
have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its begetters. 
It was enough for them to realize or to hope that they had created 
an organism; it has taken a century and has cost their successors 
much sweat and blood to prove that they created a nation.15 
The Constitution we now have is much more than the few 
hundred words of the Philadelphia draftsmen. It is the entire fabric 
14. See C. BURDICK, THE LAW OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 3-22 (1922). 
15. 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920). 
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of usage, understanding, political behavior, and statutory imple-
mentation, erected on that base and compounded with the glosses 
of many judicial decisions. Evolution has brought changes which 
habit has confirmed. One instance is the transformation of the 
electoral college. Thus the American political structure is a complex 
living organism, no longer a mere document. To interrupt its func-
tioning by an attempted general revision of the original framework 
would be an experiment presumptuous in nature and fraught with 
peril. To such an attempt might fitly be applied the words used by 
Edmund Burke with regard to the British constitution: 
An ignorant man, who is not fool enough to meddle with his clock, 
is however sufficiently confident to think he can safely take to pieces, 
and put together at his pleasure, a moral machine of another guise, 
importance, and complexity, composed of far other wheels, and 
springs, and balances, and counteracting and co-operating powers.16 
As a nation we have reached that stage of maturity, we are so 
much a going concern, that our constitutional development must be 
allo·wed to proceed, as in the six generations just passed, by the 
accretions of use and practice. As with the British constitution, its 
essence resists definition. Jefferson records a dinner conversation 
in 1791 at which John Adams and Alexander Hamilton differed as 
to what the British constitution really was. Said Adams: "Purge that 
constitution of its corruption, and give to its popular branch 
equality of representation, and it would be the most perfect con-
stitution ever devised by the wit of man." Hamilton said: "Purge 
it of its corruption, and give to its popular branch equality of 
representation, and it would become an impracticable government: 
as it stands at present, with all its supposed defects, it is the most 
perfect government which ever existed."17 Black.stone, after describ-
ing the three branches of King, Lords, and Commons, thought the 
British constitution was so admirably tempered and compounded 
that nothing could endanger or hurt it but the destruction of this 
equilibrium. He thought that, if the independence of any one of the 
three was ever lost, "there would soon be an end of our constitu-
tion," and the people would be "reduced to a state of anarchy."18 
'-¥alter Bagehot in writing The English Constitution knew better. 
Development since his time has gone even further in concentrating 
16. E. BURKE, Appeal From the New to the Old Whigs in 3 WoRKS OF THE RIGHT 
HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 111 (H. Bohn ed. 1855). 
17. PADOVER, supra note 12, at 1211. 
18. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES Introduction § 2. 
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all power in the House of Commons, so as to create a political sys-
tem more flexible and more responsive to the popular will than any 
other, and as stable as our own. 
This course of steady constitutional evolution is the only one 
practicable for a society of the size and complexity of the United 
States. For individual amendments, separately weighed and con-
sidered as codified solutions of separate problems, there is always 
room. It is the daring innovation of a great assize to rewrite the 
classic document of 1787 which seems to me the height of presump-
tion and the source of disaster. 
